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1 INTRODUCTION
Mexican industry has been undergoing a far-reach-
ing change since 1983, when the government re-
placed its import-substituting strategy with an in-
dustrial restructuring programme aimed at resolv-
ing the economic crisis (Wijnbergen 1990). Con-
cretely, the government has encouraged Mexican
firms to reorient production to the external market
by deregulating the economy. This has obviously
modified the long-standing organizational and tech-
nological patterns of many manufacturing plants.
The motor industry has played a special role in this
programme. Its performance as leading manufac-
turing exporter and generator of value-added in the
past decade has enabled Mexico to become one of the
most outward-oriented developing countries (Nunez
Peres 1990). In particular, seven assembly and en-
gine plants located in the North after 1980 have been
leading the transformation of manufacturing.
The impressive growth of automobile production in
the North, which has largely been driven by its
integration with the North American market, clearly
shows how international competition affects the
location and development of Mexico's export facili-
ties. The Mexican motor industry (MMI) is a key
case for illustrating two critical aspects of the present
Mexican industrial restructuring: (a) new links with
the world economy, and (b) the spatial patterns of
recent industrialization in Mexico.
This article focuses on the second of these two
points. Section 2 highlights the MMI's general per-
formance and also its new locational patterns. Sec-
tion 3 pays attention to the organizational changes
associated with implementation of Just-in-Time/
Total Quality Control (JIT/TQC) systems by the
most important exporting plants, owned by the Big
Three US motor companies (Chrysler, Ford and
General Motors) in the North.
The author wishes to thank John Humphrey for comments on an
earlier version of this article.
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2 THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MEXICAN MOTOR INDUSTRY
Since 1983, five out of the six transnational motor
companies with operations in Mexico have deep-
ened their export-orientation, partly as a reaction to
the new needs of the American market but also as a
result of the crisis of the domestic market. The
weakness of the domestic market caused losses in
the industry equivalent to US$1.5bn. between 1981
and 1986 (Shaiken and Herzenberg 1987).
The government stimulated an export orientation by
a process of deregulation, enacting two decrees in
1983 and 1989 which promoted the exports of com-
ponents and finished vehicles. The 1983 decree
increased local content requirements and obliged
firms to balance their imports and exports. This
forced firms to export. The 1989 decree (i) reduced
the local content requirement, (ii) abandoned the
requirement that Mexican motor parts be incorpo-
rated into vehicles and (iii) allowed firms with trade
surpluses to import vehicles. These decrees put
government-industry relations on a new footing.
The government's economic policy was adjusted to
the productive needs of the motor industry for the
first time (Samuels 1990). In particular, the Mexican
subsidiaries of the Big Three US motor companies
benefited greatly from the new legal initiatives be-
cause the two decrees allowed them to establish five
engine/assembly plants in the North. This is the
largest export complex in Mexico.
The five plants expanded passenger car exports
twenty-fold between 1983 and 1987. In 1985 the
export value of engines was nine times the export
value of passenger cars, but by 1987 the ratio was I
to 1. By exporting 78 per cent of all engines and 92
per cent of all automobiles produced between 1983
and 1987, the five American plants turned the chronic
deficit of the motor industry as a whole into surplus.
Exports rose from US $483.1 mn in 1983 to US $3204
mn in 1987. In 1983, exports of all vehicles reached
only 3.3 per cent of sales in Mexico, but by 1987 this
had increased to 39.7 per cent. All but 5 per cent of
these exports went to the USA.
Chrysler and Ford increased their export ratios from
4 per cent in 1977 to 66 per cent in 1987, while for GM
the figures were 4 per cent and 44.1 per cent respec-
tively (AMIA 1991). In contrast, Nissan concen-
trated its efforts on the domestic market, where with
VW it is the main producer and employer in the
assembly industry. Just recently these two firms,
along with Renault, have been exporting engines
(and automobiles in VW's case) to their parent com-
panies, but to a lesser extent than the American
subsidiaries.
The export boom started in 1983 with greatly in-
creased export of engines. The Ramos Arizpe com-
plex2 more than doubled its production of engines in
relation to 1982, and in the same year Ford's new
engine facility at Chihuahua came into operation.
By 1985, the plants established or expanded in the
early 1980s by GM, Chrysler Ford and VW were
exporting 1.3 million engines for passenger cars to
the USA and Germany. Four years later, with the
installation of other engine plants in Aguascalientes
(Nissan) and Durango (Renault), and the maturation
of previous investments, exports rose to 1.6 million
units, equivalent to 20 per cent of the US market for
engines (Carrillo 1990). Currently, the total export
capacity of all these firms amounts to 2.5 million
engines per year.
Assembly of vehicles was also greatly expanded.
Between 1985 and 1987, Ford-Mazda built a new
plant at Hermosillo, as did Nissan at Aguascalientes.
VW also expanded its plant at Puebla, as did Chrysler
at Ramoz Arizpe. Of these new investments, the
Ford facility at Hermosillo was the most significant.
It had a capacity of 135,000 finished vehicles per
year, and in 1987 it accounted for 42.6 per cent of
Mexican exports of built-up cars. The performance
of Ford-Hermosillo plant along with the explosive
growth of VW at the end of the past decade, in-
creased total car exports from 141,492 units in 1987
to 249,926 units in 1990.
2.1 Changes in the Regional Location of Firms
The concentration of these new plants in the North of
Mexico has transformed the MMI's geographical
2 This complex is made up of two engine plants (owned by Chrysler
and GM) and one assembly plant (GM). It was opened in 1979.
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distribution. During the first 50 years of its existence
(1925-1977), assembly plants were concentrated in
or near the main industrial cities, which gave rapid
access to mass markets. The transnational compa-
nies in the industry placed their own supplier net-
works close by, because only in the centre of Mexico
could they find an existing industrial base. The
closing down of three firms built during the 1960s at
some distance from Mexico City, and the motor
parts producers desire to save transportation costs,
ended by concentrating even more facilities in the
Centre (Bennett 1986). From 1962 to 1977, almost 80
per cent of motor vehicle production was located in
Mexico City and Toluca.
Figure 1 shows the impact of the location of plants
for export in the North. These plants are mainly
located in greenfield sites (with the exception of
Monterrey) with relatively limited industrial devel-
opment and weak union organization. In these
plants, close links between suppliers and manufac-
turers are established from the outset because of the
intensive application of JIT/TQC concepts. For this
reason, the supplier is, generally, located close to the
manufacturer, sometimes within a one-kilometre
radius. Currently 31 per cent of vehicles and 63 per
cent of engines are produced in the northern region
of Mexico, whereas 15 years earlier there was virtu-
ally no production at all.
Behind this great spatial division lies a new pattern
of regional specialization within the Mexican auto-
motive industry. Firstly, plants located in the North
produce basically for export: four- and six-cylinder
engines, small and medium cars, light commercial
vehicles and parts. The plants in the centre of Mexico
have specialized in six and eight cylinder engines,
medium size cars and heavy duty lorries, mostly for
the domestic market. Secondly, there is a minimum
exchange of parts and components between both
type of plants because of their different degrees of
integration with their parent companies. Plants in
the North rely much more on imported parts than
those in the Centre. Finally, the technical skills of the
labour force and the level of automation in the
northern plants are considerably greater than in the
Centre (Wong-Gonzalez 1989).
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Figure 1: The Geographical Location of the Export-Oriented Plants of Mexicos Car Industry, 1990
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3 ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
TRANSFORMATIONS
3.1 New Patterns of Specialization in the
Supply Industry
The restructuring of the automotive sector has com-
pelled suppliers to modify their traditional produc-
tive specialization Between 1980 and 1990 the motor
parts maquiladora3 plants (APM) drastically changed
their productive orientation. Having formerly con-
The nu2quiladora' are in-bond plants set up in the North of Mexico
under an agreement between the Mexican and US Governments.
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centrated on producing electrical systems, they have
increasingly engaged in the production of engines
and other parts. This rapid transformation has been
led by the Big Three US producers who own ap-
proximately 25 per cent of the 160 APM plants
existing in Mexico and employ 39 per cent of the total
labour force working in them. Such a transforma-
tion required a greater emphasis on manufacturing
as opposed to merely the assembly of wires and
harnesses. Engine parts, suspensions and wind-
Ti'uana
Mexicali
In-bond Plants
The United States
Newly Established Plants - 1980s
Nogales Cjuarez
. M Ford Engines
Chrysler T Cars
GMGM Conversion of Old Plants - 1960s
screens are being produced, and casting and ma-
chining processes have been introduced rapidly in
factories created by joint ventures between large
national producers and the multinational assem-
blers. Likewise, large Mexican companies have
adopted the maquiladora regime in order to supply
particular products to the assembly plants. In such
cases, the national plants quite often receive technol-
ogy from the terminal plants to help them meet
quality requirements (Arjona 1990).
The motor parts industry is made up of producers of
(i) 'principal components', (ii) 'parts and systems of
low technology' and (iii) 'rough components of low
technology' (Booz-Allen and Hamilton 1987). So
far, among the firms not operating within the special
maquiladora regime (the great majority of Mexican
firms), only the producers of 'principal compo-
nents', supplying parts of high- and medium-tech-
nology directly to the assembly plants, have under-
gone important changes in their productive activi-
ties. There are some 40 firms of this type. The rest of
the manufacturers (around 360) mostly offer 'ma-
ture articles' to the inward-oriented plants or to the
producers of 'principal components' which then do
further machining work on them (Unger and Saldana
1989). These products do not change rapidly and do
not have a high level of innovation.
To ensure a successful implementation of the JIT/
TQC system, the Big Three have adopted stringent
criteria to select suppliers. According to the manag-
ers interviewed, reliability, cooperation, delivery
time, quality and the lobbying capacity of the suppli-
er's parent company in the USA are the key factors
for becoming a supplier in the North. Ford's big
suppliers belong to the same companies which have
kept close contact for a long time with Ford in the
USA and Europe. GM and Chrysler in Ramos
Arizpe have developed their own network of suppli-
ers by subcontracting plants to powerful economic
groups which have already proven to be reliable in
past international projects. These plants operate
under certain preferential tariff regimes which pro-
mote the 'indirect exports' of suppliers. This has
rapidly concentrated production among a small
number of producers. Eight out of the ten largest
suppliers of the whole MMI are placed in the North.
These top firms now account for 50 per cent of
The survey included 49 automotive plants (suppliers and
assemblers) from both the South and the North. A scale for measuring
the degree of automationwas constructed, taking into account the use
of robots, numerically-controlled tool-machines and automated work
stations.
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exports and 20 per cent of the domestic output of the
motor parts sector.
For other producers, the chances of supplying the
outward-oriented plants depend greatly, therefore,
on their links with these major suppliers of 'princi-
pal components'. In practice they decide how many
other suppliers will be included in any productive
project. National suppliers contracted by outward-
oriented plants may not have another affiliate and
are, therefore, disadvantaged when in competition
with transnational component suppliers who can
provide parts for the major motor companies in
different countries. In fact, only a few Mexican
companies can successfully survive as independent
suppliers, depending on a monopolistic position in
the domestic market. The remaining Mexican first-
tier suppliers have relations with transnational com-
panies which include subcontracting, technology
agreements and joint ventures.
3.2 Application of Flexible Technologies
Suppliers are integrated into the export strategies of
the assemblers very unevenly. As a result, only the
largest northern facilities have upgraded their pro-
ductive processes in order to become more competi-
tive producers (Boon and Mercado 1990). A recent
survey shows that the outward-oriented plants (as-
semblers and suppliers) showed a higher index of
automation than the inward-oriented ones: 65 per
cent of the former's plants were fully automated,
whereas 30 per cent of the inward-oriented plants
were only semi-automated; the rest presented a low
degree of automation.4
The outward-oriented plants have also introduced
the greatest number of techniques such as deliveries
just in time, use of statistical process control (SPC),
work teams and Quality Function Deployment. The
main reason lies in the advanced JIT/TQC system
put into practice by the outward-oriented assem-
blers. They demand that their suppliers meet a
'minimum level of efficiency' which is based on
seven basic operational criteria: quality, productiv-
ity, delivery time, safety, group techniques, techni-
cal capacity and flexibility. To reach such a mini-
mum, suppliers have to work jointly not only with
the assemblers but with their own sub-suppliers as
well.5 Without this cooperation with suppliers, it
Ford's suppliers in the North used to have 10 meetings a week with
the assembler to ensure an accurate application of JIT.
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would be impossible for them to meet the seven
criteria, since any evaluation takes all the supplier's
productive activities into account. This evaluation is
65 per cent based on analysis of SPC and applied
continuously by the assemblers. As a result, any
supplier performing badly can be dismissed at any
time, even though it may have performed well in the
past.6
This tight supervision of suppliers' performance is
aimed at continuously improving their quality and
productivity standards, and reducing delivery times.
Most of the Big Three's suppliers in the North cur-
rently produce, on average, as much as they did
three years ago, but they make them in half the time
and with half the number of defects. In doing so,
first-tier suppliers have had constantly to achieve
international standards of efficiency (scrap, re-work,
lead-time etc.) no matter how far they are situated
from the assembly plants. Suppliers situated 1,100
miles from Ford-Hermosillo, for example, should
spend no more than five days in assembling and
delivering products required by the plant, with a
reject rate of parts no greater than three per hundred
thousand. This reject level is one of the lowest in the
Ford world system (Sandoval 1988). Similar levels
of quality have been achieved at the Ramos Arizpe
complex. In these cases, record levels of quality have
been achieved by firms halving their levels of scrap
and re-work every two years. As a result, the
suppliers have obtained the quality awards offered
by the Big Three: Ql. Spirit and Pentastar. As a
consequence, however, supplies have been concen-
trated in the larger, transnational supplier compa-
nies, as was noted in the previous Section.
It is important to note that the US assemblers do not
have a single strategy for their suppliers. Even when
they share the same supplier, they may use them in
different ways. GM-Ramos Arizpe, for example,
takes products from one subsidiary of LSSC with a
lower value than Ford-Hermosillo takes from an-
other subsidiary of the same firm. The reason for this
is that production at GM-Ramos Arizpe is limited by
a production quota agreed between GM in the USA
and the Union of Automobile Workers (UAW). The
assembly plant is not allowed to produce more than
14 per cent of the GM's total supply of the 'Model A'
(its main product). To keep below this limit, GM
only takes seat covers from LSSC, rather than the
6 Facilities using Quality Function Deployment are also evaluated
by foreign customers. Therefore, they have to adopt additional
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whole seating system, as is the case at Ford-
Hermosillo. To minimize the effects of this restric-
tion, GM encourages firms like LSSC to develop a
network of local producers of raw materials in which
Mexico is more competitive (such as yarn, leather
and vinyl). If the costs of these items can be brought
down, GM can incorporate more local content with-
out exceeding the restrictions negotiated with the
UAW. The absence of such constraints in Ford's case
enables the LSSC plant at Hermosillo to practise a
more complex JIT/TQC system.
This difference in organizational approaches forces
suppliers to comply with the assemblers' require-
ments in very different ways. Once again, differ-
ences between Ford and GM can be seen. Ford
Hermosillo imposes delivery requirements which
vary according to different categories of supplier.
The plant has four types of suppliers: (1) 'Suppliers
JIT', (2) 'Total Responsibility Supplier', (3) national
suppliers and (4) international suppliers. The 'sup-
pliers JIT' make two deliveries a day and are located
near the plant. The same is true of the 'total respon-
sibility suppliers', which must, in addition, work
jointly with the manufacturer on the assembly line.
This type of supply requires a high level of synchro-
nization between both parties because any deviation
from the original specifications means severe pun-
ishments for suppliers (20,000 dollars penalty per
minute if the assembly line is stopped by a supplier's
error). The national and international suppliers
practise a system named 'one-day-at-a-time'. In this
case JIT deliveries are ensured by delivery every
seven or ten days of the quantities of products
required daily during a seven- or ten-day period.
These are stored in local warehouses or at the port of
Guaymas and then delivered to the plant in one-day
batches This mimics JIT delivery.
The Ramos Arizpe complex uses a different system.
Suppliers programme their daily production on the
basis of a one-week programme. Each GM and
Chrysler order amounts, on average, to 12 weeks of
a supplier's production. Under this system, the
assembler renews its request when finishing the
eleventh week, and suppliers always have a week's
time to reprogramme their future activities. In
practice, deliveries do not always follow this plan
exactly. Deliveries have to be made in accordance
with the suppliers' daily production matrix. This
techniques, such as experimental design or laboratory tests, to correct
any mistakes detected by customers abroad.
matrix arranges a schedule of up to four deliveries a
day. The parts are produced either a day before or
as little as four hours before they are delivered.
Many suppliers have difficulties in delivering on
time because they are still familiarizing themselves
with JIT/TQC systems. These suppliers are mainly
Mexican and have no past experience with the motor
industry. Prior to being contracted by the assem-
blers or major component suppliers, they supplied
their products - such as garments, leather or yarns -
to customers outside of the motor industry. Some of
them still deliver their products in large batches,
which obliges their customers to keep larger stocks
than they would wish.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Although plants for export have been implementing
advanced flexible systems in the North of Mexico,
they have not yet developed extensive and close
corporate relationships inside 'industrial zones'. This
is in part because innovation is mainly controlled by
the suppliers to the parent companies. Moreover,
introduction of JIT/TQC concepts has only been
efficiently applied by the biggest suppliers, which
do not have explicit subcontracting programmes for
national suppliers. Only a few Monterey-Saltillo-
based companies organize supply transactions
through a multi-layered network of national suppli-
ers. But this is an exception, because these compa-
nies have proven to be 'national champions' in
products such as steel or glass for a long time. The
real problem lies in incorporating into the new JIT
complexes those suppliers which do not have links
with transnational or large Mexican companies. In
these cases, implementation of JIT/TQC takes a lot
of time since producers have to reconvert their former
craft production layouts. Hence, they are more
interested in solving internal manufacturing prob-
lems (scrap, re-work, low quality products) than in
developing complicated strategies for manufactur-
ing organization (Gomez Aguirre 1990).
Under such circumstances, it is not realistic to say
that the new industrialization in the North, follows
what Storper and Walker (1989) call, a 'clustering'
geographical pattern. The territorial dispersal of
plants is still a widespread phenomenon in Mexico,
precisely because many automotive firms have not
been drawn into the new organizational changes.
For this reason, the JIT motor complexes in Mexico
should be characterized as a 'semi-clustering'
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locational model, combining two different models.
On the one hand, there is a clustering model, charac-
terized by a strengthening the intra- and inter-corpo-
rate spatial linkages, because of the intensive appli-
cation of JIT/TQC concepts. On the other hand,
there is dispersal model in which links between
suppliers and users remain unchanged. Spatial
decentralization of production is made possible by
large stocks of work-in-progress. As a result, the
Mexican motor industry is composed of a wide
range of factories with uneven technological and
organizational development.
The future of this uneven development in Mexico is
a question which remains open. Up until now many
external factors have favoured the emergence of the
clustering model in the North. For example, car
design has standardized certain processes and prod-
ucts at the world level, making certain components
usable in different models and slowing down the
rate at which products and process become obsoles-
cent (Schoenberger 1987). This has enabled Mexico
to continue producing components for which it has
had a comparative advantage for a long time. The
introduction of new technologies and materials has
been incremental, allowing Mexican firms to remain
competitive. Similarly, the successful displacement
of flexible technologies to Mexico shows that the
need to be 'close' to markets and suppliers is only
relative. Northern Mexico seems close enough for
JIT, even when linkages are made with Japan (for
supply) and North America (for supplies and mar-
kets). The northern plants' performance shows that
hybrid forms of JIT can take place in developing
countries when productivity and quality are en-
sured at a lower cost than in developed countries.
These factors should not be overestimated, since in
an industrial world dominated by JIT clustering of
firms 'only a small advantage can be gained pres-
ently through sourcing in low-wages areas' (Womack
and Jones 1985: 405). In particular, only a few
developing countries can compete successfully in
products such as major and minor mechanical com-
ponents, or in Mexico's case finished parts, on the
basis of lower overall costs (Lamming 1989;
Sanderson et al. 1987). The growth of the Mexican
motor industry in the North is heavily dependent
upon the productive strategies of the Big Three
motor producers in the United States. Mexico's
chances of developing producers which are com-
petitive on the world market will diminish substan-
tially if the American subsidiaries start to lose their
market share in the USA.
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